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I. INTRODUCTION
Smith, president of E.com, Inc., believes his firm's securities
are undervalued Believing that expanded coverage in the financial
press will cause E.com's securities to trade at higher prices, Smith
begins a public relations program designed to help investment analysts more accurately forecast his firm's future performance. Jones,
financial analyst, takes information from the public relations program, drafts an optimistic forecast for E.com, and then asks its executives for their review and comment. Smith and his executives make
extensive factual and descriptive edits to the report but refuse to
comment on financial earnings projections, citing a longstanding company policy against such. Instead, Smith gives Jones repeated assurances that E.com is "well on its way to a great quarter," and that he
was "incredibly bullish" on his firm's future earnings potential.
Catching the innuendo, Jones drafts a favorable report on E.com's
prospects, causing the financial markets to bid up the company's stock
price in reliance on the new information.
In reality, Smith and his executives realize that E.com's internal earnings projections are far below those predicted in Jones's market report, but they take no measures to correct their company's
inflated stock price. In the meantime, Baker, individual investor,
purchases a large stake in E.com, relying on the company's market
price as an indication of its fair value. Soon thereafter E.com discloses
its low earnings in its mandatory quarterly financial report, its stock
price plummets, and Baker loses his life savings. Baker brings a private securities fraud action under federal securities law alleging that
E.com intentionally misled analysts-and therefore the market-to
inflate its stock price. Is E.com liable to Baker (and other harmed investors) for the analyst's misstatements? Under what circumstances
should it be?
The prevailing standard for determining issuer liability under
the federal securities laws for third party misstatements asks whether
the issuer "sufficiently entangled" itself with the analyst's report to
such a degree that the analyst's misstatements can fairly be attributed to the issuer.! If the entanglement threshold is met, a company
has a duty to correct material misstatements affecting the market

1.
See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980). The hypothetical
presented loosely resembles the facts before the Elkind court.
2.
See id. at 163.
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when it subsequently realizes their inaccuracy,3 else the company becomes liable for civil and regulatory sanctions under the federal securities fraud laws.4 Not surprisingly, courts applying the standard have
had to grapple with what "entanglement" means in application.! Although the doctrine is developing with greater clarity,6 the standard
for liability remains too muddled for corporate managers to avoid running afoul of the law with predictive certainty.'
This Note cuts a bright-line path through the entanglement

thicket. Part II discusses the forecasting methods of investment analysts and the information they use to construct their corporate valuations. Part Ill describes the federal regulatory framework governing
corporate disclosure and Rule 10b-5 liability for wrongdoing. Part IV
describes the contours of the prevailing entanglement standard and
its related theories. Part V refines the problem in light of the
analytical framework governing corporate liability for third party
misstatements. Part VI discusses the policy interests of the key
stakeholders involved, including securities issuers, investors, and society at large. Finally, Part VII recommends that courts adopt a practical bright-line standard for pre-publication entanglement liability
premised on explicit corporate agreement with an analyst report's final contents, marshaling current doctrine, policy interests, and the

3.
See ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Trust v. Ross (In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1993).
4.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). The SEC has a broad arsenal of
enforcement tools, including injunctive relief, the power to prohibit violators from serving as
officers or directors of corporations with registered public securities, and the power to seek
monetary penalties, as well as criminal prosecution. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a)-(h), 78ff(a)-(c) (1994).
Private claimants also have a cause of action under 10b-5 and may seek heavy damages for
securities fraud violations. See Herman v. McLean & Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)
(noting that a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for more
than thirty-five years).
5.
See Greenberg v. Compuware Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1012, 1020-21 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(attempting to reconcile inconsistent positions taken by the Second and Fourth Circuits on the
question of corporate liability for third-party misstatements in analyst reports); Colby v. Hologic,
Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 214 (D. Mass. 1993) (recognizing that the First Circuit has not
determined when third party statements may be imputed to a securities fraud defendant, and
that the case law is divided elsewhere).
6.
See generally Robert Norman Sobol, Comment, The Tangled Web of Issuer Liability for
Analyst Statements: In Re Cirrus Logic Securities Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1051 (1997)
(describing the growth of jurisprudence regarding corporate liability for third party
misstatements and drawing distinctions between related theories of recovery).
7.
See, e.g., Editorial, Vengeance or Growth?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1991, at A14 (describing
how Oracle Systems Corp. has stopped discussing forward-looking corporate prospects with
analysts after being sued nineteen times for securities fraud in 1990). Theoretically, if the
standards governing corporate liability for third-party misstatements were clear, then firms such
as Oracle would be better able to avoid securities fraud suits stemming from manager-analyst
interaction.
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realities of modern financial analysis for support. Part VIII resolves
the hypothetical posed above.
II. INVESTMENT ANALYSTS AND THE MECHANICS OF
SECURITY VALUATION
Developing a practical standard for securities issuer liability
under the federal securities laws is a complicated task because the
financial markets rely on investment professionals and other third
party intermediaries to collect and disseminate information on corporate value. Consequently, when investors rely on misleading information to their detriment, determining whether a company has committed fraud or analysts have simply overestimated the company's future
earnings and growth prospects often raises difficult factual and legal
issues. The current legal standards governing corporate liability for
third party misstatements are largely shaped by the role analysts play
in capital market machinations.
A. The Role of Investment Analysts
Securities analysts collect and distribute the information required to make intelligent investment decisions to investors lacking
the time, acumen, and resources to make these decisions independently Rational investors want to know whether a publicly traded
firm's expected return justifies its stock price in light of the perceived
risk."° In exchange for brokerage fees,11 analysts supply this infor-

8. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 560-61 (1984). The authors define information as "data that has the capacity to
alter one's beliefs about the world, or... one's beliefs about the appropriate price of an asset."
Id. at 561.
9.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (1990) (defining investment analysts as persons employed to discover new
information about securities issuers, market trends, or changing economic conditions before
others can learn the same information and act accordingly).
10. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
173-88 (Michelle E. Cox & Elaine Rosenberg eds., 5th ed. 1996) (discussing the basic elements of
asset portfolio selection, including quantitative methods for calculating security risk and risk
premiums).
11. Professor Langevoort pointed out that active investors need information to make
informed decisions and some pay for this information directly or indirectly, through brokerage
commissions. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 1025. By contrast, other investors take market
efficiency for granted and engage in passive investment strategies, such as market index and
mutual funds. Id.
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mation by estimating the equity value of the corporations they follow 2
through a two-stage valuation process. 3 First, analysts gather all
known and publicly available factual, or "hard," information about
corporations and the environments in which they operate. ' Next and
most importantly, analysts attempt to forecast future corporate earnings by calculating the company's anticipated future cash flows. 5 The
inherent uncertainty of future events forces analysts to cast these
earnings projections as statistical probability distributions,'6 known as
"soft information."" Analysts produce soft estimates of future earnings
in one of two ways, the first and easiest of which is simply adopting
internal projections supplied directly by the corporations." Alternatively, if a company withholds internal earnings data, analysts must
create their own forecasts by piecing together fragments of accessible
information, including publicly available data and voluntary corporate
disclosures bearing on future earnings. 9 Ultimately, analysts couple
soft information together with historical data to form a master forecast of future earnings.' Analysts then determine a corporation's
market valuation by adding the discounted present value2' of the com-

12. See generally Robert S. Harris & Felicia C. Marston, Estimating Shareholder Risk
Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts,21 FIN. MGMT. 63 (1992).
13. See Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to
Securities Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1519-20 (1992) (explaining the two stages in the
valuation of securities); Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 8,at 561 n.41.
14. See Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 8, at 561. The authors define hard information as
current and historical information bearing on stock prices, as distinguished from predictions
about future, uncertain events. See id. Examples of hard information include current press
releases, government policies and interest rates, general business, social, and economic trends,
as well as records of past stock prices and corporate performance. See Brountas, supra note 13,
at 1520.
15. See S. LEVINE, FINANCIAL ANALYST'S HANDBOOK 1026 (1975) (noting that theory and
evidence explain the close association between earnings and stock dividends, and that all
evidence suggests that earnings account for the major portion of securities prices); Gilson &
Kraakman, supranote 8,at 561 (observing that securities prices ultimately turn on expectations
of future earnings).
16. See Gilson & Kraakman, supranote 8,at 561-62.
17. See Brountas, supra note 13 at 1522 (noting that information dispensed by corporate
management to market analysts is most often shaped by earnings forecasts and projections
calculated within the company for internal budgeting purposes, and that these earnings
projections are known as "soft information").
15. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1028-31. If a company discloses internal earnings
projections, investment analysts verify this information to prevent fraud and to eliminate the
effects of corporate biases. See id. at 1030.
19. See LEVINE, supra note 15, at 1026.
20. See id.
21. Analysts discount future earnings by the company's weighted average cost of capital,
which considers the proportions of debt and equity in a company's capital structure and the
amount of firm risk associated with each source of financing. See generally TOM COPELAND ET
AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 239-73 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing the process for calculating a company's weighted average cost of capital).
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pany's projected earnings to the value of its current assets.' The appropriate market price of individual securities comes from dividing the
company's market valuation by its number of issued equity shares."
B. Analysts and Marketplace Efficiency
Besides providing a professional service to investors demanding information, investment analysts play another important role in
promoting capital market efficiency: ensuring that quoted security
prices fairly reflect a company's value. According to the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"), at any given time securities
prices fully reflect all publicly available ' information relevant to their
value.' Securities analysts serve as key agents for marketplace efficiency because they uncover, collect, and analyze information bearing
on stock prices and transmit their analyses to the financial markets,
which then impound the information into security prices."6 Motivated
by reputational interests 7 as well as profit opportunities,' analysts
aggressively investigate all possible sources of information bearing on
firm prospects, often conducting on-site facility inspections and inter-

22. See LEVINE, supranote 15, at 1026.
23. See BREALY & MYERS, supra note 10, at 73 (demonstrating that the total value of a
firm's common stock is equal to the discounted value stream on all future dividends to be paid on
existing stock).
24. Material non-public information must be either disclosed to the entire market or kept
confidential. See Richard M. Phillips & Gregory T. Nojem, Disclosures to SecuritiesAnalysts: The
Drafty Exposure of the Open-Door Policy, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus. INSIGHTS, May 1990, at 3.
See generally infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
25. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 554-60. The ECMH comes in three generally
accepted classifications: the weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form models. See id. at
555-56. In its weak form, the ECMH holds that capital markets presumptively reflect only the
historical information that affects securities prices. See BREALY & MYERS, supranote 10, at 329.
The semi-strong model posits that capital markets securities prices reflect all past and currently
available public information. See id. The strong form assumes that securities prices reflect all
past and currently available public and private, or "inside," information affecting stock value.
See id. Scholars by and large agree that the semi-strong form of the ECMH best approximates
the observable operations of the financial markets. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
246, 246 n.24 (1988) (citing empirical studies confirming that the securities prices on well-traded
markets reflect all publicly available information). In Basic, the Supreme Court enshrined the
ECMH when it held that investors were entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance on
securities prices in securities fraud cases. Id. at 245-47.
26. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (noting that the SEC recognizes the
importance of investment analysts for the preservation of healthy markets; that it is
commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information" by meeting with and
questioning corporate officers and other insiders; and that the analysts' information may become
the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's securities).
27. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1030 (asserting that analysts are objective in part
because their reputations are at stake).
28. See id. at 1025.
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views with corporate officers and the firm's competitors.' Once
released, the significance of new information becomes impounded into
security prices almost instantaneously. Widespread dissemination is
unnecessary, as securities prices achieve rapid equilibration when a
few knowledgeable traders controlling a critical volume of market activity act on the new information.' Therefore, in the ECMH paradigm,
securities are considered fairly priced at any given time,3' and the
Supreme Court has accordingly entitled investors to presumptive reliance on the integrity of market prices to make investment decisions."
C. Analysts and Securities Issuers
Public corporations generally want market analysts to cover
them so that their securities will trade at optimal prices.33 The limited

29. See id. at 1026. Professor Langevoort describes the analyst's investigative efforts:
Information is gathered from numerous sources, beginning with press releases and
publicly available documents such as issuer filings with the SEC. In analyzing the profit
potential of a newly announced product, for example, an analyst might talk to the issuer's
competitors and customers. But at some point, in order to fill out the picture thus far
drawn and to facilitate an accurate assessment of information previously generated,
company officials should be questioned. These questions may be raised in group meetings
with analysts commonly sponsored by issuers, or in face-to-face or telephone contacts
between a single analyst and a company insider.
Id. Some courts have described the investigative efforts of investment analysts as the "mosaic
theory," because skilled analysts can combine seemingly inconsequential inside information with
public information into a sketch of corporate affairs that reveals material non-public
information. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1977).
30. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 569-70 (arguing that "universally" informed
trading really reflects only the activity of traders who are direct recipients of information, and
that the rapidity of price adjustments depends on the volume of informed trading).
31. But see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Ve call a
market 'efficient' because the price reflects a consensus about the value of the security being
traded-not necessarily because the price captures the true value of the firm's assets but because
the price is the best available device to assess the significance of additional bits of information.).
32. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-45 (1988). In Basic, the Supreme Court
effectively took judicial notice of the dominant theory of market efficiency, the ECMH, by
adopting into law the "fraud on the market" theory, which relies on the ECMH. See id. at 24142. The court observed that:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed
securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available
information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the
misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the
plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such case is no less significant than in a case of direct
reliance on misrepresentations.
Id. (quoting Paul v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 (3d Cir. 1986).
33. See Brountas, supra note 13, at 1540-42. The author argues that corporate speech to
investment analysts allows for more sophisticated analysis of the information's market impact
because analysts can understand and simplify the substantive content of the information. See
id. at 1540. Because analysts are able to assess a company's disclosures and determine their
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supply of analysts relative to the number of publicly traded companies
inevitably causes some firms to experience difficulty finding a voice in
the marketplace.34 To ensure sufficient coverage, many firms attempt
to develop close relationships with analysts through formal public relations "guidance" programs as well as informal direct contact. "5
Analysts do not follow companies gratuitously. To maintain
close relationships with the financial community, firms experience
pressure to supply analysts with responses to pointed questions about
a firm's operations, including requests to review and comment on draft
analyst reports." In many ways, the relationship between companies
and analysts that ensues resembles an exchange relationship. Firms
receive the coverage they want as long as they supply analysts with
enough information to remain competitive within the financial information industry. Yet these incentives for firms and analysts to communicate test the bounds of federal securities law, which limits the
manner and types of information firms may disclose. The clash between federal disclosure policy and market demand for information is
especially attenuated in the securities fraud context, when issuers
have allegedly supplied analysts with misleading information or approved their inaccurate market reports.

validity, Brountas argues that disclosure to analysts results in an implied warranty of
truthfulness when the information communicated eventually enters the market, thereby
enhancing the disclosing corporation's credibility and improving the quality of information that
the public obtains. See id. That lack of market coverage causes a firm's security price to trade at
lower levels is not a paradox under the ECMH, as it may initially appear. If firms are
undervalued, then the market likely has not received information that would normally prompt
readjustment, making the current security price fair in the sense that it reflects all publicly
available and known information about the security's value. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1129-30.
34. See Brountas, supra note 13, at 1541 (claiming that smaller companies often experience
difficulty finding a voice in the market).
35. See Alan K Austin & Clay B. Simpson, Interacting with Analysts, in THE ART OF
COUNSELING DIRECTORS, OFFICERS & INSIDERS: How, WHEN & WHAT TO DISCLOSE 89, 92 (Alan
K. Austin et al. eds., 1998). The authors describe interactions between managers and analysts as
a "courtship dance" in which managers attempt to give analysts enough information to keep
them satisfied, while at the same time avoiding liability for any written or oral communication to
analysts that could be portrayed as a material misstatement or selective and illegal disclosure of
insider information. Id.; see also Herman v. Legent Corp., No. 94-1445, 1995 WL 115879 (4th
Cir. Mar. 20, 1995) (describing how defendant engaged in a guidance program through periodic
press releases and calls with analysts to help the market stay informed of its growth, and how
analysts attempted to predict the company's market performance based on the "guidance"
information).
36. See Austin & Simpson, supra note 35, at 91 (discussing company pressures to provide
sufficient company information to satisfy analysts).
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H. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash37 to
ensure that investors enjoy full disclosure" of material information
concerning public securities in initial offerings 9 and subsequent secondary market trading." Mandatory filing requirements,4 1 civil actions,42
and criminal penalties for violations 3 serve as the primary vehicles to
protect investors against fraud and manipulation in the securities

37. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85,
at 2-3 (1933). Before the 1929 market crash a great deal of abuse plagued the securities industry,
most of which involved the perpetration of fraud or other manipulative practices that hurt
investors and tended to destabilize the market. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933). The
House committee working on the 1933 legislation assessed the situation:
During the post-war decade some 50 billion of new securities were floated in the United
States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated during this period have
been proved to be worthless. These cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of
individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these
worthless securities. The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers
in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic
to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise. Alluring promises of easy wealth
were freely made with little or no attempt to bring to the investor's attention those facts
essential to estimating the worth of any security. High-pressure salesmanship rather
than careful counsel was the rule in this most dangerous of enterprises.
Id. at2.
38.

See JAMES D. COX E' AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2d ed.

1997) (explaining that Congress embraced affirmative disclosure as a means to curb fraud and
manipulation in the securities markets). The authors note that the '33 Act adopted the
regulatory philosophy of Justice Brandeis: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants:
electric light the most efficient policeman." Id. at 3-4 (quoting L.D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY 62 (1914)).
39. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933)). The Securities Act of 1933 governs
initial public offerings of securities. See id.
40. See id at 5. (citing S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934)). The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 governs post-issuance transactions on the nation's securities exchanges. See id.
41. See id. at 8. The '34 Act implemented a system of continuous disclosure by securities
issuers. See id. First among these, the annual report on Form 10-K, requires extensive
description of the company and its operations, audited financial statements for the fiscal year,
and the management's discussion of the firm's position and performance. See id. The 10-Q
embodies quarterly disclosures of unaudited interim financial statements and management's
analysis of financial operations. See id. Form 8-K shines light on significant events that could
otherwise go unobserved in the financial community, as it must be filed within 10-15 days of a
material corporate development, including (1) a change in control, (2) the acquisition or
disposition of a large amount of assets, (3) the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, (4) a
change in auditors, or (5) the resignation of a director in a dispute over company policy. See id.
42. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (recognizing an implied civil
cause of action for violations of the anti-fraud statutes).
43. See COX ET AL., supra note 38, at 8,11 (observing that, pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC has regulatory control over the securities exchanges, although
the Justice Department handles all criminal prosecutions arising under the Act).
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markets." Finally, Congress created the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") in the '34 Act to allow flexible enforcement of the federal
securities laws.
A. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
The federal securities laws contain several provisions requiring
public corporations to periodically disclose financial and other business-related information relevant to the firm's financial condition.
These disclosure obligations operate in tandem with the anti-fraud
provisions in providing investors with full and accurate information on
publicly traded firms, thereby reducing both investor speculation and
blatant fraud. Regular disclosure obligations include the quarterly,
annual, and current reports on Forms 10-Q, 10-K, and 8-K, and the
various forms for registration statements.4 5 Apart from these routine
disclosure obligations, firms also have an affirmative duty to divulge
material, non-public information when circumstances develop that are
reasonably likely to have material effects on a registrant's material
condition or operations results. 6 Additionally, firms must comply with
the disclosure requirements of the exchanges on which their securities
trade." Finally, firm managers operate under the "disclose or abstain
rule," which obliges public companies to release material non-public
information to the market if insider trading is anticipated or has
occurred. 8 The insider trading prohibition becomes especially problematic in the context of informal discussions between corporate insiders and analysts. 9 Executives must walk a fine line between satiating

44. See id. at 681. (noting the SEC's rule-making authority under § 10(b) of the '34 Act).
45. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (Supp. I 1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. I 1995). The
regulatory framework is based on mandatory disclosure, both in initial securities registration
statements and continuing reporting documents filed with the SEC. See Cox ET AL., supranote
38, at 4, 8. Relevant information includes facts about the company, its officers and directors, and
certain types of risk and accounting disclosure. Id. at 8-9.
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1999). See also Form 8-K Current Report pursuant to § 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,002, at 21,992 (Sept.
17, 1997).
47. See COX ET AL., supranote 38, at 19. The securities exchange acts employ a cooperative
regulatory effort between the* SEC and industry sponsored groups, such as the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the nation's ten registered securities exchanges.
See id. But see Halkin v. Verifone, Inc. (In re Verifone Sec. Litig.), 11 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that violation of an exchange rule will not support a private claim under rule 10b-

5).
48. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (holding
that insiders in possession of nonpublic material information must either disclose the
information or refrain from trading the stock).
49. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (likening management
discussions with investment analysts to a "fencing match conducted on a tightrope').
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analysts' appetite for company information without conveying material inside information, which may only be discussed if made simultaneously available to the investing public.'
B. Rule 10b-5 Liability
Federal securities fraud claims" alleging issuer responsibility
for third-party misstatements stem' from section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' and the SEC-promulgated Rule 10b-5,'
which together prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.' Section 10 of the '34 Act gives the SEC broad rulemaking authority appropriate to protect investors or the public interest, and in 1942 the Commission adopted Rule 10b-5 as a sweeping
proscription of all forms of fraud and manipulation in securities transactions.
The SEC defines fraud in Rule 10b-5 as "mak[ing] any untrue
statement of a material fact or... omit[ting] to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."' Historically, 10b-5 fraud claimants had to "establish (1) a misstatement
or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which

50. See id.
51. The federal securities laws form the basis for both SEC enforcement proceedings and
private civil actions. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing an
implied civil action under the antifraud laws).
52. See Sobol, supra note 6, at 1053. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has several antifraud provisions, but section 10(b) has the most expansive jurisdictional import and is invoked
most frequently in securities fraud claims. See id.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b)
makes it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, through the mails, or through a national
securities exchange, to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). Rule 10b-5 states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange: (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make
any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the sale or purchase of any security.
Id.
55. See Cox, ET AL., supra note 38, at 681 (noting the SEC's rule-making authority under
the Act).
56. See id.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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the [claimant] relied (5) that proximately caused his injury."' Since
any legitimate securities fraud action involves a misstatement or
omission of some sort, the five elements have collapsed into materiality alone, because courts have construed recklessness as sufficient
scienter"9 and adopted the fraud on the market theory,' which effectively eliminates a 10b-5 claim's reliance and causation requirements.6
1. Materiality
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court announced the
standard for materiality in 10b-5 fraud cases with respect to both the
substance and probable impact of speculative information released to
the financial markets. Under Basic, soft information is material if
"there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would have altered the 'total mix' of information made available."6 Materiality
further depends "at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of company activity."'
Ultimately, materiality of misleading statements is a mixed question
of law and fact that must be decided on a case-by-case basis.'
In Basic, the court applied the probability/magnitude materiality test to repeated company denials of merger negotiations.' Soon

58. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
59. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-72 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that reckless behavior meets the scienter requirement).
60. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (adopting the fraud on the market
theory).
61. See id. at 241-42; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. The fraud on the
market theory posits that securities markets are efficient and reflect all known current and
historical information bearing on stock prices. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42. Misstatements
affecting security value are therefore considered impounded into prevailing security prices. See
id. Because investors rely on securities prices as fair and accurate representations of corporate
value, they therefore detrimentally rely on fraudulent information contained in a security's price.
See id. at 247. In this sense, by trading on securities prices, investors both rely upon and are
damaged by material misstatements. See id.
62. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (citing TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)) (holding that information is material if it would likely influence a reasonable investor's
investment decision and there is a substantial likelihood that the information would have
significantly altered the 'total mix' of available information).
63. See id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc)).
64. See id.; see also Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3rd Cir. 1984) (describing it
as a mixed question of law and fact).
65. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227.
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after the denials, the company asked the New York Stock Exchange to
suspend trading in its shares and issued a public statement that another company had approached it regarding a merger.' A class of former company shareholders brought a securities fraud suit alleging
that they had been damaged by trading in the company's stock, since
management's merger denials had artificially depressed the company's stock price. ' Although the Supreme Court remanded the case
for further factual determinations, in dicta it suggested that the probability of merger could be assessed through factors such as board
resolutions, directions to investment bankers, and actual negotiations
between the two companies." With respect to the magnitude of the
potential merger, the Court suggested that the size of the two companies and the premiums offered over market value were good, but not
necessarily dispositive, evidentiary indicia.6 9 The Court stressed that
no particular factor by itself could make the merger discussions
material. "
2. Corporate Puffery
Courts view certain types of management promotional communications to the financial markets as categorically immaterial. Companies compete for financing in the capital markets, and corporate
managers therefore experience substantial pressure to promote their
firms to the investing public. Consequently, firm managers tend to
characterize corporate prospects in their most favorable light, often
using vague and optimistic statements to.encourage investor participation. Courts describe this practice as "puffing"7' and generally find
such communication lacking sufficient specificity to cross the materiality threshold."
While acknowledging the Supreme Court's Virginia Bancshares
v. Sandberg holding that expressions of belief or opinion concerning
current facts may become material if they lack a reasonable basis, 3
most lower courts have kept the materiality bar raised high in the

66. See id. at 227-28.
67. See id. at 228.
68. See id. at 239.
69. See id.
70. See id. Instead, the question turns on each case's circumstances. See id.
71. See Halkin v. Verifone, Inc. (In re Verifone Sec. Litig.), 11 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir. 1993);
Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (D.N.H. 1996).
72. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993).
73. See VirginiaBancsharesv.Sandberg,501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991).
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context of corporate puffing. 4 Courts have taken a skeptical view of
puffing, based largely on their common assumption that investors and
analysts are too sophisticated to rely on indefinite expressions of optimism and depend instead upon specific facts." Unless corporate
managers base predictions of company performance on specific and
supporting facts, courts discount puffing as inactionable rhetoric. 6
For example, in Raab v. General Physics Corp., a nuclear utility consulting and support company made statements in its annual
report that regulatory changes had created a demand for the company's services with a 30-40% expected growth rate over the next several years, and that the company was positioned to carry its success
from the year before into the future. 7 A group of investors brought a
securities fraud class action, alleging that the company had not disclosed the full impact of contract delays caused by the Department of
Energy." The Fourth Circuit characterized the company's statements
as corporate puffery lacking the specificity necessary to influence
market prices and, therefore, immaterial.'
C. The IrregularDisclosureLandscape
1. Insider Trading and Selective Disclosure
Publicly traded firms face insider trading penalties for selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to investment analysts when that information creates an unfair trading advantage.' In
such situations, the analyst too must either disclose the information or
refrain from trading;8 ' otherwise, both the insider and the analyst face

74. See Rosenbaum v. Syntex Corp. (In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig.), 95 F.3d 922, 928 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that simple predictions and forecasts not constituting a guarantee are not
actionable); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 82 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that company
disclosures regarding contingent future possibilities are not actionable); In re Verifone, 11 F.3d at
871; Raab, 4 F.3d at 289; Krim v. Banctexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993)
(citing Friedman v. Mohasco Corp., 929 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that projections not
worded as guarantees are generally not actionable under federal securities law)).
75. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 289 (holding that statements must be definite to be actionable).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (holding that Rule 10b-5 is
violated unless corporate insiders either disclose material nonpublic information before trading
or abstain from trading altogether).
81. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
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insider trading liability.' The liability threat for selective disclosure
presents corporate managers with the difficult task of providing analysts with enough information to ensure the desired market coverage
without crossing the insider-trading threshold.' Courts have acknowledged the fragile relationship between managers and analysts, which
one court characterized as "a fencing match conducted on a tightrope."8
Recognizing the realities of financial analysis and forecasting,'
and the importance of analyst activity to market efficiency,' the
Supreme Court created some exceptions to selective disclosure liability" by moving away from the disclose-or-abstain regime to a rule
premised instead on improper motive.' Despite the Supreme Court's
efforts to accommodate insider-analyst communications, the SEC has
intensified its efforts to prevent unfair trading advantages born of
selective disclosure. 9 In a striking policy departure from the Supreme
Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC, the SEC recently stated its intention
to "electrify[ ] the tightrope,"' by putting reputational benefits gained
from selective disclosure9 under the improper motive umbrella."

82. See In re Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17, 480 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,812, at
83,945 (Jan. 22, 1981).
83. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980). The court took
notice of the delicate line managers must mind in their communications with investment
analysts, recognizing that "management must navigate carefully between the 'Scylla' of
misleading stockholders and the public by implied approval of reviewed analyses and the
'Charybdis' of tipping material inside information... which it knows to be erroneous." Id.
84. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 556 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-59 (1983) (observing that an excessively stringent
selective disclosure rule could have an inhibiting influence on the role of securities analysts,
which are necessary for the preservation of a healthy market).
86. See id.
87. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1027. The early rule was that mere possession by a
corporation of material, nonpublic information gave rise to a duty to disclose. See id. (citing SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
88. See id. The first Supreme Court decision to depart from the original rule was Chiarella
v. United States, in which the Court held that mere possession of material, nonpublic
information does not give rise to a disclosure duty. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 23334 (1980). The Court extended this exception three years later in Dirks, when it held that
liability for selective disclosure turned on whether the corporate insider communicated
information to the analyst in order to receive some direct or indirect personal benefit. See Dirks,
463 U.S. at 655.
89. See, e.g., SEC v. Stevens, No. 12813, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
1991). In the Stevens case, which ultimately settled, the SEC had urged that a company CEO
had selectively disclosed inside information to securities analysts-whose clients traded on the
information-for a reputational benefit. Id. If the SEC aggressively pursues this approach, all
informal discussions between corporate insiders and analysts would be subject prosecution
regardless of improper motive, since every insider communication could conceivably be classified
as effected for reputational gain.
90. See Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman, Ferreting in the Interstices of the S.E.C.
Attitudes to Securities Analysts, (Jan. 24, 1991) quoted in Carl W. Schneider, Fencing on the
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In SEC v. Stevens, the Commission demonstrated its new
"reputational benefit' approach to selective disclosure when it brought
suit against Phillip J. Stevens, Chairman and CEO of Ultrasystems,
Inc., after Stevens made unsolicited phone calls to securities analysts
warning them of a sudden business downturn likely to affect his
company's earnings.93 Some of these analysts promptly contacted their
clients, who traded on the new information. The Commission alleged
that, after a previous unexpected negative quarterly earnings
announcement by Ultrasystems, an analyst who had covered the company ceased his market coverage and publicly challenged Stevens on
the company's financial data. 5 The Commission charged that Steven's
advance notice to market analysts of the new downturn was motivated
by his expectation of a "direct, tangible benefit to his status as a corporate manager."96
Commentators point out that the SEC has not aggressively
pursued its new theory of selective disclosure for reputational benefit
as subject to improper motive liability, but the threat of insider
trading liability remains real. Depending on the SEC's actions (i.e.,
discretionary enforcement decisions), many aspects of the delicate
relationship between managers and analysts could be aggressively
prosecuted as illegal tipping of inside information, and analysts would
have to find new mechanisms for uncovering information upon which
to base their earnings projections.99
2. Duties to Correct and Update
When corporations release materially false information to the
financial markets, they have an obligation99 to correct those disclo-

Electrified Tightrope: Shocking Executives Who Value Reputation, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus.
INSIGHTS, July 1991, at 2.
91. See Stevens, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451, at *2-3. Here "reputational benefits" means
credibility that corporate managers and executives get from analysts and the greater financial
community for being forthright about company prospects. Id. In Stevens, the Commission
argued that the company executives sought a benefit to reputation that would enhance future
income. Id.
92. See Brountas, supranote 13, at 1530-31.
93. Stevens, 1991 SEC LEXIS 451, at *2.
94. See id. at *3.
95. See id. at *2.
96. Id.
97. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the SecuritiesAnalyst, N.Y.L.J., May 30, 1991, at 5
(explaining the SEC's aggressive posture after SEC v. O'Hagan).
98. See id.
99. See COX ET AL., supra note 38, at 714. Statements that are inaccurate when made
constitute, of course, a primary violation of 10b-5. See id.
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sures as long as the information remains "alive" and continues to
influence the security's price." A similar rule applies to corporate disclosures of forward-looking information that are true when released
but become inaccurate due to subsequent events."' With respect to the
duty to update, inaccuracy turns on whether the earlier statement
would be misleading if released currently.'2 These duties expire when
new information or passage of time makes the misleading disclosures
obsolete. 3 Apart from the duties to correct and update corporate disclosures, firms that simply possess material nonpublic information
that may affect the market incur no affirmative disclosure obligations
unless disclosure is otherwise mandated under the federal securities
laws."
3. The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine
Public corporations enjoy measured insulation from 10b-5 securities fraud liability for forward-looking disclosures that later become
misleading so long as their initial statements are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language. 5 This "bespeaks caution" doctrine
does not, however, mean that companies can escape liability for their
misstatements simply by including boilerplate cautionary language."4
Instead, "meaningful" turns on whether reasonable minds could not
disagree that the challenged statements were not misleading. 7
Although the "bespeaks caution" doctrine developed at common
law no later than 1986,"' Congress codified the doctrine in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). ' With the aid of

94,073, at 91,030
100. See, e.g., Kamerman v. Steinberg, 1988 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1988), affd, 891 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1989).
101. See Carl W. Shneider, Update on the Duty to Update: Did PolaroidProduce the Instant
Movie After All?, REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG., May 9, 1990, at 83, 84.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
105. See Paynes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1997); Grossman v.
Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir. 1997). In this way, the bespeaks caution doctrine
provides the courts with a mechanism for ruling as a matter of law that a defendant's forwardlooking representations contained enough risk disclosure concerning the subject matter of the
disputed statements to protect the defendant against claims of securities fraud. See In re Worlds
of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
106. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 958-59 (citing Durning v. First Boston Corp.,
815 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987)).
107. See id. at 959.
108. See Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d49, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1986).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. I 1995). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements made by specified
("PSLRAJ)
persons. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 27A, 109 Stat.
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this statutory safe harbor, the SEC encourages public corporations to
make more voluntary disclosures of soft information and protects such
statements if they are made in good faith and with a reasonable
basis.' °

IV. ISSUER LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY MISSTATEMENTS
The foregoing framework for corporate disclosures of marketsensitive information describes liability hazards when issuers speak to
the market directly. The analysis becomes significantly more difficult
when misleading information reaches the market through analyst
reports. Put simply, the law must determine the circumstance under
which a securities issuer should be held liable for the misstatements of
third parties."'
Rules for responsibility for information disseminated through
analyst reports might be said to fall along a spectrum. At one pole,
analysts generate and distribute reports with no company involvement. At the other, companies essentially prepare reports and channel
them through analysts to the financial community. Of course, if only
these two extremes existed, issuer liability for analyst reports would
simply be a function of authorship. The real difficulty begins when
companies interact with analysts in varying degrees along the spectrum, and the final report reflects involvement from both parties. Traditionally, locating a liability threshold on the spectrum of company
involvement in an analyst report's preparation has been the province
of the entanglement doctrine."'

737, 749 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2). Under this section, a written or oral predictive
statement garners protection when its source identifies it as forward-looking and accompanies it
with "meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual
results to differ." 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(1).
110. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1999).
111. Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 214 (D. Mass 1993) (framing the question
accordingly).
112. But see Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding
that companies should not have to police everything written about them and be liable for their
inaccurate contents).

2000]

SECURITIES ISSUER LIABILITY

965

A. Genesis of the Entanglement Doctrine
Generally, companies face no liability for misleading claims
made about them by independent third parties.' Significant exceptions, though, have developed that practically swallow the rule.114 The
Second Circuit spawned the doctrinal forebear of this line of cases
when it decided Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers Co., which introduced the
"entanglement" theory of issuer liability for third party misstatements."5 In Elkind, holders of Liggett & Meyers, Co. stock brought a
class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the firm
neglected its duty to update misleading analyst reports created in part
with the company's guidance." 6 The Elkind court noted that, although
companies generally have no obligation to correct statements made by
outsiders,"' firms could nonetheless incur 10b-5 liability 1ff
third party
8
misstatements could fairly be attributed to the company.
Under Elkind, attribution turns on whether company officials
have become "so involved" or "sufficiently entangled" in the preparation of the analyst's report that it implies company agreement with
the report's contents,"' in which case liability accrues to the company
just as if it had made the statements itself."0 And, once an analyst
report's contents become attributable to a company, the firm incurs
liability if it fails to update information in the report that later
becomes materially misleading."' The Elkind court observed that al-

113. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 941-42, 949
(2d Cir. 1969) (holding that, although companies may voluntarily choose to correct a statement
in the press for which it is not responsible, nothing in the securities laws compel it to do so).
114. See Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL 211313, at *14 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997)
(holding that companies may be held liable for analyst statements if they review them and
endorse the spin analysts put on company information); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that companies that make misleading statements to analysts with the intent
that those statements be communicated to the market are liable under rule 10b-5); Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a company may be liable for
an analyst's statement if it entangles itself to such an extent that the report can be attributed to
it); Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-5-20017, 1995 WL 743728, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
1995) (holding that companies may endorse analyst reports after their publication and thereby
adopt the statements as their own).
115. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163 ('The controversy before us is whether Liggett sufficiently
entangled itself with analysts' forecasts to render those predictions 'attributable to it.' ").
116. See id. at 158. The company had been dissatisfied with its recent stock performance
and attributed its suboptimal security price to lack of market appreciation for the breadth of its
operations. See id. Accordingly, the firm began an "analyst program" designed to promote better
market coverage. Id.
117. Id. at 162.
118. Id. at 163.
119. Id.

120. See Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp 1298, 1310-11 (D.N.H. 1996).
121. See id.
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though Liggett & Myers had examined and commented on analyst
reports and made factual and descriptive suggestions, the company
had never commented on earnings forecasts or left inaccurate factual
statements uncorrected.' Based on these facts, the court held that
Liggett & Myers had not "placed its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts' projections,"
so that the company had no duty
12 3
reports.
analyst
the
to correct
While the facts of the Elkind case applied the entanglement
analysis to pre-publication company involvement,1 1 4 subsequent court
decisions have adapted the doctrine to fit other, related fact
patterns."
B. Pre-PublicationEntanglement
Pre-publication entanglement theory can render companies responsible for misstatements authored by third parties.
Under
Elkind, responsibility for analyst reports depends on whether a company indicates agreement with a report's contents, which can be
express or implied from company involvement in the report's preparation. 7 When companies expressly adopt analyst reports before their
publication, then corporate responsibility for the report's contents is
relatively uncontroversial."8 In such cases, corporate involvement approximates complete authorship on the responsibility spectrum.
Courts have struggled, however, to fix the degree of company involvement in an analyst report's preparation necessary to imply agreement.
1. Traditional Entanglement Theory
The Elkind court's use of the term "entanglement!' suggests
that corporate liability can be implied in a range of the responsibility

122. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 162.
125. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Compuware Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1012, 1020-21 (E.D. Mich 1995)
(discussing the Elkind courts entanglement standard and its applicability to both prepublication involvement and simple adoption of an already-published report).
126. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163. Authorship is important for discriminating between
entanglement theories: pre-publication entanglement applies when the company comments on
statements authored by third parties; the conceptually similar conduit theory applies when
companies supply third parties with misleading information, which the analyst then channels to
the market. See In re Cirrus Logic Securities Litigation, 946 F. Supp. 1466, 1467 (distinguishing
between pre-publication entanglement and the conduit theory).
127. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163.
128. See id.
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spectrum's middle sections, which charts joint involvement between
the company and the analyst." The Elkind court ultimately held that
company review of an analyst report, including correction of factual
errors, did not imply agreement because the company corrected all
erroneous factual elements and, consistent with management policy,
refused to comment on earnings forecasts."n Persuaded that the analysts knew they were not being supplied with internal earnings data,
the Elkind court held that the company's involvement did not extend
beyond the report's factual elements13 ' to its overstated earnings projections.'32 Accordingly, some courts have interpreted Elkind as embracing a "scope of responsibility" approach, which classifies the types
of information companies have reviewed and holds them accountable
for at least those categories to which they made substantive contributions. "'3 By contrast, other courts have characterized Elkind as focusing on the cumulative impression that the company's involvement
gives the analyst, in light of company practices and contextual
circumstances." For example, if a company's established policy does
not prohibit commenting on earnings projections, then reviewing an
analyst report and commenting only on factual and descriptive matters may imply that the forecasts were accurate.'35 Cases premising
liability on the scope of a company's involvement and the impressions
they create have used language such as "fostered" or "induced" as

129. See Greenberg, 889 F. Supp. at 1020 (observing that Elkind speaks in terms of
"entanglement," causing confusion among litigants). Elkind relied upon Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 439, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), and Krebs v. Fall River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731,
739-40 (10th Cir. 1974), to support the proposition that "[w]e have no doubt that a company may
so involve itself in the preparation of reports and projections by outsiders so as to assume a duty
to correct material errors in those projections." Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163.
130. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See In re ICN/Viratek Sec. Litig., No. 87 CIV. 4296, 1996 WL 164732, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 9, 1996) (holding that review of a third party report and correction of some factual errors
while knowingly leaving other inaccurate statements uncorrected made the company liable for
the report's contents); Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 603 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("[W]hen a company undertakes to pass on earnings forecasts through analysts reports, it must
correct figures that are incorrect.'); see also In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43,
55 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that issuers may be liable for failing to correct an analyst statement
when the issuer entangles itself in the making of a statement, the issuer knows a statement is
false when made, and the issuer fails to disclose the statement's falsity to investors).
134. See In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995),
aff[d sub nom. Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL 211313 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997)
(holding that the pattern of manager-analyst interaction did not amount to an implied company
adoption of an analyst report because there was not practice of commenting on earnings
projections).
135. See id. at 1377 n.6.
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synonyms for entanglement liability. 136 These cases attempt to fix corporate entanglement liability at a point along the responsibility spectrum where companies guide analysts to misleading conclusions without overtly controlling the report's contents or making explicitly
fraudulent representations. 37
2. Adoption Theory
A more developed line of pre-publication entanglement cases
emphasizes corporate control over the information finally transmitted
to the market, thereby premising a company's responsibility on facts
closer to actual authorship. Known as the prepublication "adoption"
theory, 38 this version of entanglement has its roots 3 ' in the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Raab v. General Physics Corp., which addressed
the practical question of how analyst reports could be attributed to
companies. "' The Raab court held that companies must have complete
control over an analyst's report to be held responsible for its accuracy,
in part due to the possibility that analysts will take company
comments out of context or misinterpret them.' Having announced
this practical requirement, the Raab court further held that, to satisfy
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), "' plaintiffs alleging entanglement must specify how corporate information reached the investment
analyst, identify the precise source of the information, and describe
43
how the corporation could have controlled the statement's content.

136. See In re Boston Tech., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (holding that entanglement has occurred
when the issuer fosters, induces, or otherwise causes the statement to be made).
137. See id.
138. See Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017, 1995 WL 743728, at *11-*12 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 1995) (describing pre-publication adoption).
139. But see Schwartz v. Novo Industries, A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Although Raab appears to be the first case espousing the view that a company must adopt the
final draft of an analyst report-effectively exercising control over its final contents-in order to
give rise to entanglement liability, Schwartz preceded Raab and touched upon the theme of
corporate control over analyst comments when corporate liability is premised on an analyst's
misstatement. Id.
140. Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993). The Raab decision
concentrates on the second portion of the holding in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Co., which
involves the manner in which firms place their imprimatur, either expressly or impliedly, on an
analyst report. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Co., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
141. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 288-89.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Federal Rule 9(b) requires that averments of fraud be pled with
specificity. Id.
143. Raab, 4 F.3d at 288; see also Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298, 1310
(D.N.H. 1996). The Schaffer court invoked a detailed tripartite test requiring the plaintiff to (1)
identify specific forecasts and name the defendant insider who adopted them, (2) point to specific
interactions between the insider and the analyst that establish the entanglement; and (3) state
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In the wake of Raab, the adoption theory evolved to require
demonstration of a "two-way flow of information" between an analyst
preparing a market report and a corporate insider expressing agreement with the report's "spin."'44 In cases following Raab, courts have
largely accepted the idea that adoption depends on the two-way flow of
information,'45 although they continue to disagree about the precise
manner in which corporate adoption of an analyst report occurs.' 6
Most courts now require plaintiffs to (1) identify specific forecasts and
the insider who adopted them, (2) point to the specific insider-analyst
interactions causing the entanglement, and (3) state the dates on
which the acts that gave rise to the entanglement allegedly occurred.'47
A few have gone so far as to require plaintiffs to demonstrate that
analyst reports directly quote corporate officers 8 to prove adoption.4
The development of the pre-publication adoption theory favors
securities fraud defendants and might well be read as a reaction to the
exploding volume of securities litigation" and abuses by plaintiffs

the dates on which the acts that allegedly gave rise to entanglement occurred. Schaffer, 924 F.
Supp. at 1310.
144. See Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL 211313, at *14 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997)
(holding that adoption is required for companies to approve the spin an analyst gives companysupplied information); Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
145. See Eisenstadt, 1997 WL 211313, at *14 (holding that entanglement requires a two-way
flow of information); Rosenbaum v. Syntex Corp. (In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig.), 95 F.3d 922, 934
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a one-way flow of information is insufficient to prove entanglement);
Schaffer, 924 F. Supp. at 1310 (holding that adoption requires a two-way flow of information).
146. Compare Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 213 (D. Mass. 1993) (quoting Murray
v. Sony Corp. (In re Columbia Sec. Litig.), 747 F. Supp. 237, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
attribution depends on whether company officials made misleading statements of fact, which the
report directly quoted)), with Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(finding analyst's articles not actionable despite quoting corporate officials who offered opinions
but not statements of fact), and Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (finding no liability absent showing that company officials offered misleading factual
statements).
147. See Schaffer, 924 F. Supp. at 1310; In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1086,
1096 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affid 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837
F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
148. See Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 213 (quoting Murray v. Sony Corp. (In re Columbia Sec.
Litig.), 747 F. Supp. 237, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)) (holding that attribution depends on whether
third parties directly quote company officials and whether these quoted statements are factually
misleading).
149. See Schaffer, 924 F. Supp. at 1310 (holding that, while the First Circuit has not spoken
to whether direct quotation is necessary to impute analysts' statements to companies, the court
would demand a "significant and specific, not merely a casual or speculative, entanglement
between the defendants and the analysts" with respect to the disputed statements).
150. See PrivateSecurities Litigation Under the Federal SecuritiesLaws: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & UrbanAffairs, 103d Cong.
1-2 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dodd noting the rising volume of securities
litigation).
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attorneys trying to extract settlements.15 ' Courts have justified their
heightened pleading requirements primarily on judicial efficiency
grounds. 52 Instituting stricter pleading requirements responds to the
inherently speculative nature of analyst forecasts and the incredible
burden corporate managers would face if they had to answer for every
inaccurate forecast generated." Stricter pleading standards also serve
judicial efficiency by eliminating overly tenuous claims, and reducing
the great difficulty managers experience when facing an ill-defined
entanglement standard that leads to capricious judgments, as it
regards them as adopting only those statements they have examined
and found reasonably accurate."4
3. Entanglement and Primary Liability
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
entanglement doctrine, it has drawn distinctions between degrees of
10b-5 participatory liability, which naturally inform-and possibly
limit-any understanding of pre-publication entanglement. Accordingly, in recent entanglement theory cases, defendant issuers have
sought cover from Central Bank v. First InterstateBank, which eliminated secondary liability under Rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting
securities fraud."' These defendants have argued that Central Bank
foreclosed issuer liability for third party statements, thereby abrogating Elkind," because section 10(b) cases prior to CentralBank had
described entanglement in their pleadings as "aiding and abetting."' 7

151. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-89; see also Suna
v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 1997). The Suna court held that, while it has not
decided whether statements in analyst reports may be attributed to defendant companies, a
strict 9(b) dismissal pleading standard was necessary to prevent plaintiffs from bringing baseless
suits against securities defendants "in order to increase settlement amounts or to engage in a
fishing expedition for evidence on which to base their claims." Id. at 73.
152. See In re Caere Corp., 837 F. Supp at 1059 (noting that heightened pleading
requirements serve the policy goals of FED. R. CIV. P. 11 by discouraging marginal and baseless
complaints).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). The Central Bank
Court's rejection of aider and abetter liability only applies to private civil actions. Less than a
year after Central Bank, Congress enacted the PSLRA, which restored the SEC's authority to
enjoin the aiding and abetting of securities fraud. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7St(f) (1995)); see also SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir.
1996). Thus, while the SEC may still bring claims for aiding and abetting securities fraud, this
line of attack is not available to private litigants.
156. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997); In re ICN/Viratek Sec. Litig.,
No. 87 CIV. 4296, 1996 WL 164732, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996).
157. See In re ICN/Viratek, 1996 WL 164732, at *6. The court observed:
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Lower federal courts confronted with this defense have pulled
Elkind clear of Central Bank by characterizing entanglement claims
as theories of primary liability." This characterization recognizes that
companies could intentionally use unwitting analysts to defraud the
market: the analyst would escape liability for lack of scienter, while
the company would be untouchable as a mere aider and abettor.5 '
Unwilling to believe the Supreme Court intended to leave defrauded
investors without a remedy, lower courts have analytically refined the
pre-publication entanglement doctrine as a theory of primary liability
under §10(b)." 6 The cases addressing the effect of the Central Bank
holding on pre-publication entanglement are scant, and only one federal circuit court has squarely addressed the issue. 6' Therefore, to the
extent that pre-publication entanglement entails something less than
complete company control over an analyst report, this variety of
entanglement remains subject to attack from defendants via Central
Bank."'
C. Post-PublicationRatification
Akin to the adoption theory of entanglement, the post-publication ratification of analyst reports by corporate managers model
emerged from In re Rasterops Corporation Securities Litigation. The
analytical difference between these two theories is subtle. In pre-publication adoption, plaintiffs search behind the scenes to attribute the
analyst's words to the corporation." By contrast, the post-publication
ratification theory concerns corporate representations about the analyst report's accuracy after its publication." In many respects, the
post-publication ratification theory is easier to apply because the
M

The differences between Elkind... and this case demonstrate that the application of
Elkind will not vitiate Central Bank by allowing plaintiffs to transform the majority of
aiding and abetting claims into claims of primary violation. On the contrary, Elkind held
only that a certain, sharply limited category of claims could, at that time, have been pled
in the alternative as aiding and abetting claims were also properly categorized as claims
of primary violations of § 10(b).
Id.; accord Cooper, 137 F.3d at 624-25.
158. See Cooper, 137 F.3d at 624-25; Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.
1996); In re ICN/Viratek, 1996 WL 164732, at *6.
159. See In re ICN/Viratek, 1996 WL 164732, at *6.
160. See id.
161. See Cooper, 137 F.3d at 624-25, and Warshaw, 74 F.3d at 959, both from the Ninth
Circuit.
162. See In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984-87 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that Central Bank forecloses 10b-5 liability against everyone except the person
that actually makes the misleading statement).
163. See In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
164. See id.
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question of authorship is moot and a company's primary liability rests
on readily observable acts. While not yet expressly embraced by the
circuit courts,165 the SEC has recently acknowledged the legitimacy of
the ratification liability theory,1" and several lower courts have incorporated the theory into their entanglement analysis. 67
Despite the ratification theory's growing acceptance as legitimate grounds for liability, courts remain divided as to what type of
activity actually indicates ratification." The cases developing this
theory suggest that firms may ratify analyst reports not only explicitly
but also implicitly by their actions, such as by distributing alreadypublished reports to prospective investors.' Commentators have

165. See Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL 211313, at *14-15 (9th Cir. Apr. 28,
1997), affg 891 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Eisenstadt court reviewed In re Cypress
Semiconductor on appeal and did not directly comment on the lower court's post-publication
ratification theory, leaving some doubt as to the theory's legitimacy. Id. The Eisenstadt court
held, however, that plaintiffs seeking to hold a corporation liable for an analyst's predictions
must demonstrate "that a corporate insider provided misleading information to an analyst, that
the analyst relied on this information and that the insider somehow endorsed or approved the
report prior to or after its publication." Id. at 14 (citing Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)) (emphasis added).
166. See In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39472, 1997 WL 784548, at *9
(Dec. 22, 1997). The SEC has taken the view that under certain circumstances an issuer that
disseminates false third party reports may adopt the report's contents and be fully liable for the
misstatements contained in them, even if it had no role in the report's preparation. See id.
Accordingly, if an issuer knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information it distributes
is false or misleading, it cannot be insulated from liability because management was not actively
involved in the preparation of that information. See id.
167. See Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017, 1995 WL 743728, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 7, 1995) ("[U]nder the post-publication ratification theory, liability rests on the company's
implied representation that the analysts' forecasts are accurate.'); In re Rasterops Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. C-93-20349, 1994 WL 618970, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994) ("[A] plaintiff must allege
facts establishing that the company adopted, endorsed or sufficiently entangled itself with
analysts' reports.'); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1428 (3d
Cir. 1997) (declaring that express company ratification of a published analyst forecast is
tantamount to the company making the misleading statement itself).
168. Compare In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1428 (holding that corporate
expression of comfort with analyst report after its publication constitutes ratification), with
Herman v. Legent Corp., No. 94-1445, 1995 WL 115879, at *5 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1994) (finding
company president's expression of comfort with published analyst report was not actionable as a
matter of law), and Plevy v. Haggarty, 38 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (doubting
whether expressions of comfort place the company's imprimatur on the projection).
169. See In re Rasterops Corp., 1994 WL 618970, at *3 (finding that "[b]y passing out the
favorable analyst reports, Rasterops was clearly implying that the company agreed with the
forecasts contained in the reports"); see also In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F.
Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affd sub nom. Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL
211313 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997). The In re Cypress Semiconductor court held that "in contrast to
pre-publication entanglement, liability does not depend upon imputing the analysts' statements
to the company. Rather, the corporation's implied representation that the analyst's forecasts are
accurate is itself actionable. This is a subtle, yet important distinction between pre-publication
adoption and post-publication ratification." Id. at 1377; see also Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at
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taken this possibility to its logical conclusion, suggesting several ways
that ratification may be implied. 7 ' One area of controversy surrounding the post-publication ratification theory of entanglement is the significance of managerial "expressions of comfort" with analysts' reports,
and whether these representations rise to the level of ratification. At
least two circuits have reached different conclusions on this question, 7' and it remains unsettled.
D. The Conduit Theory
If an analyst can be considered merely the instrument of a
company's fraud, courts bypass the entanglement analysis altogether
and proceed to the "conduit. theory.' ' . The distinction between prepublication entanglement and the conduit theory, then, lies in the assumption that, with respect to entanglement, companies presumably
provided analysts with accurate information, and, through a two-way

exchange, the company adopted the analyst's inaccurate interpretations of the company's truthful information."3 However, when companies deliberately or recklessly provided an analyst inaccurate information, courts have imposed 10b-5 liability regardless of whether
the company adopted the resulting report.'
For example, in In re Cirrus Logic Securities Litigation, shareholders of Cirrus Logic, Inc., a semiconductor manufacturer, brought a
securities fraud class action against the company and certain officers
and directors for, among other things, making fraudulent statements
to investment analysts, and thereby, the market. Although the district court conditionally granted the company's motion for summary
judgment on this allegation, " the court made clear that companies

*12 (holding that anti-fraud liability may accrue for circulation of analyst reports when pled
properly).
170. See Austin & Simpson, supra note 35, at 106 (suggesting that attaching Internet
hyperlinks from corporate web pages to analyst reports may also be sufficient for liability under
the ratification theory).
171. See cases cited supranote 168 and accompanying text.
172. See In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Litig., 946 F. Supp. 1446, 1467 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that
companies that use analysts as conduits for their fraud are primarily liable under Rule 10b-5).
The court noted that "one could characterize a company's intentional or reckless
misrepresentations to analysts as a form of entanglement with statements in analysts' reports
(or in other communications with the market) that rely on misrepresentations." Id. at 1467 n.12.
173. See id. at 1467.
174. See id. As with pre-publication entanglement, plaintiffs must prove that the fraudulent
statements reached the market and thereby caused security prices to reflect the inaccuracies.
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
175. See In re Cirrus Logic, 946 F. Supp. at 1451-52, 1466-67.
176. Id. at 1479.
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may not lie to securities analysts and escape liability because they did
not adopt the analysts' interpretations of the misleading statements.'"
The court observed that "[c]ases requiring more than a one-way flow of
information to show entanglement presuppose that the information
provided by the company is truthful and accurate. No such two-way
flow of information is necessary, however, where the company deliberately or recklessly provides misinformation to the market.'. 8
V. THE PROBLEM RESTATED
Resolving questions of corporate responsibility for third party
misstatements has become less problematic since the advent of the
conduit and post-publication ratification theories, but pre-publication
entanglement liability remains too nebulous for managers to predictably avoid liability. Litigants do not know whether entanglement permits companies to implicitly adopt an analyst report by tacitly or subtly coaxing its authors to misleading conclusions, "9 or demands
nothing short of complete control over the report's final contents to
trigger liability."w Evidence of this confusion lies in the scores of cases
in which plaintiffs pepper their complaints with talismanic phrases
such as "the defendants entangled themselves to a sufficient degree,"
or "the company placed its imprimatur on the analyst's report," without enumerating facts to support these claims.'8 ' Judges have fared

177. Id. at 1467.
178. Id.
179. See In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 & n.11 (D. Mass. 1998)
(remarking that entanglement may occur when a company fosters or induces an analyst's
misleading statement, which suggests entanglement by implication).
180. See Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 WL 211313, at *14 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997)
(holding that entanglement arises only when companies endorse an analyst's report prior to its
publication); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that control
is necessary to demonstrate entanglement).
181. In re Boston Tech., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58 (dismissing the complaint because the
plaintiff alleged "entanglemene' with generality); In re DSP Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 954025-CAL, 1997 WL 678151, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1997) (finding that plaintiff that alleged
that defendant "adopted or otherwise entangled themselves with the reports of securities
analysts" was too general to survive a motion to dismiss); Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C95-20017, 1995 WL 743728, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995) (ruling that complaint failed to state
a claim when plaintiffs pled in conclusory fashion that the defendants adopted the reports); In re
Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (ruling that plaintiffs narrowly
met their pleading requirement under FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) when they alleged that defendant had
"sufficiently entangled itself with the analysts' forecasts to render those predictions 'attributable
to it' " without more specificity (quoting Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d
Cir. 1980))); Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 214 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that complaint
failed when plaintiffs made only vague allegations of guidance).

SECURITIES ISSUER LIABILITY

2000]

975

little better, often phrasing their holdings in the same conclusory
fashion, without clear explanations for how the facts met the law to
yield a given outcome."'
Doctrinal considerations only blacken the clouds hanging over
the pre-publication entanglement theory. Insofar as pre-publication
entanglement may encompass misleading corporate guidance, the
Supreme Court's CentralBank holding threatens to eliminate at least
part of the joint-author entanglement theory as a strain of now invalid
aiding and abetting liability." None of the circuit courts have addressed the issue decisively, and an array of lower courts have just
begun to sort out whether and how Central Bank affects the entanglement theory. These still uncharted doctrinal waters only complicate courts' efforts to apply the pre-publication entanglement theory
consistently.
The uncertainty surrounding pre-publication entanglement
produces many undesirable results. The vague standard floods courts
with litigation," as corporate managers and disappointed investors
must look past unsettled law to live courts to determine whether the
company's activities made it liable for an analyst's statements. As long
as disappointed investors think they have a chance at recovery under
the murky pre-publication entanglement theory, they have an incentive to file suit. Similarly, as long as companies can press the boundaries of overreaching in their pre-publication interactions with securities analysts, they may elect to risk the threat of lawsuits in return
for inflated stock prices or other short-term corporate objectives.'
M

182. See Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 214 (dismissing complaint alleging entanglement through
corporate guidance without clear explanation of where the liability threshold lies); In re Verifone
Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that "[i]n order to be liable for
unreasonably disclosed third-party forecasts, defendants must have put their imprimatur,
express or implied, on the projections" without further explanation of when liability attaches).
183. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding "that a
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under rule § 10(b)'); In re MTC
Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (interpreting Central
Bank to mean that "a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to
be held liable under Section 10(b)').
184. See Hearings, supra note 150, at 1-2. Congress's enactment of the PSLRA was a direct
response to the burgeoning volume of securities fraud lawsuits. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-89. Among other things, the PSLRA provided a
statutory safe harbor for some forward-looking statements made by companies subject to the
SEC's continuous disclosure requirements. See id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69495.
185. At some point, of course, companies must make full and accurate disclosures under the
SEC's mandatory disclosure policies. See COX ET AL., supra note 38, at 8. Nevertheless,
commentators have pointed to the numerous strategic incentives corporate executives have to
place upward pressure on their company's stock prices in the short term. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions:A Behavioral Theory of Why CorporationsMislead Stock Market
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The unpredictable entanglement "standard" also engenders inefficiency within the mechanisms for securities valuation. As the prepublication entanglement standard moves in the direction of content
control, as articulated in Raab, companies will have wider freedom to
guide analysts to incorrect conclusions with virtual impunity.
Accordingly, security prices will become even more susceptible to inaccurate information, which may erode investor confidence in market
efficiency and fairness. Although scholars point out that the financial
community may punish firms that overreach in their interactions with
investment analysts,1" this theory offers little comfort to harmed investors lacking a legal remedy for securities fraud. Without legal protection for reliance on analyst valuations based on company-supplied
information and guidance, investors must factor this unpredictable
risk into their investment calculus. In light of Congress's policy objectives in passing the securities acts, an entanglement standard providing no protection from this subtle form of manipulation frustrates
the legislative purpose.'87 For these reasons, the pre-publication
entanglement theory demands further refinement.

VI. POLICY PARAMETERS
Any attempt to improve the pre-publication entanglement
theory must look to satisfying three important policy considerations.
Each of these stands beneath the over-arching theme of preserving
investor confidence. "' Foremost among these is the importance of constant manager-analyst interactions and the effect legal disclosures
have on security pricing. 8' Investors demand accurate information to
make sound decisions, and a liability standard that curtails manager-

Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 111-18 (1997) (analyzing the
incentives corporations have for misleading investors, including insider trading, preserving
secrecy, and promoting the outward appearance of firm confidence).
186. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1027. Analysts have a reputational interest at stake
when they report on a company's earnings prospects, and their objectivity helps to overcome a
serious moral hazard in the process of corporate disclosure. See id. at 1030.
187. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976) (observing that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was "intended to protect investors against manipulation of stock
prices").
188. Briefly, the American capitalist economy depends upon capital to fuel economic
expansion. The financial markets depend upon the surplus capital of investors to supply this
demand. See ZvI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 17 (James M. Keefe et al., eds., 3d ed. 1996). If
potential investors determine that the markets are too risky, they will distribute their capital
surpluses to safer opportunities. Therefore, investor confidence is key to preserving the
capitalist system.
189. See supraPart II.
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analyst communications would sacrifice market efficiency for investor
protection." Under these circumstances, investors could be more certain that securities prices reflected accurate information, but the scant
amount of information reflected in the price would no longer accurately portray the totality of corporate value. As a result, securities
prices would fluctuate wildly when companies made infrequent but
complete disclosures, and investor confidence would fade in response
to increased market volatility.
The need to preserve the dissemination of corporate information to the markets through manager-analyst interactions plays off
against protecting investor reliance on the accuracy of corporate disclosures. Fundamental to the preservation of investor confidence, this
policy was the purpose animating Congress's passing the '33 and '34
Acts. 9 ' The quantity of information that becomes impounded in security prices becomes worthless for valuing securities when key pieces of
that information contain fraud. Securities can become mispriced, 92
and investors that trade in reliance on the fairness of security prices
are subject to great financial losses when securities adjust to subsequent, contradictory disclosures. 9 ' Accordingly, a pre-publication
entanglement standard that makes it too easy for companies to mislead analysts and investors1 4 undermines market efficiency and
investor confidence with as much force as a standard that starves the
market for information.
The third policy bearing on improving the pre-publication
entanglement theory is the importance of preserving judicial and
macroeconomic efficiency. Lawsuits are expensive, and when parties
must resort to the courts to determine whether actionable fraud has
been committed, society carries the burden of these costs-directly, by
paying the legal system to handle them, and indirectly, by devoting
resources to an unproductive endeavor. An efficient issuer liability
standard for pre-publication manager-analyst interaction should

190. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The securities
laws do not serve as investment insurance.'); In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054,
1059 (N.D. Cal. 1993). A standard that makes it easy for disappointed investors to shift their
risk to companies would create a disincentive for managers to communicate with analysts. See

id.
191. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194-95.
192. In contrast to the previous scenario, in which securities prices do not embody enough
information to represent true market values, the securities fraud scenario lends itself to
manipulative inflation of securities prices.
193. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
194. For example, if the pre-publication adoption theory prevails, then companies will be free
to mislead investors, avoiding liability as long as they do not exercise control over the final
statement or make blatantly fraudulent disclosures.
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minimize social costs as much as possible, and a clear liability standard, understood before the fact, is an indispensable means to this
end. And clear standards depend on doctrinal fidelity with higher
court precedents, leaving potential litigants with a clear and common
understanding of the controlling law.
VII. BEYOND ENTANGLEMENT: CRAFTING A BETTER
LIABILITY STANDARD
Many of the problems with the pre-publication entanglement
theory spring from its source, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,'95 and
identifying these deficiencies provides a basis for refining issuer
liability for third party misstatements. Elkind has spawned confusion
in the courts because its language is hopelessly imprecise and its
holding subject to different interpretations."
The expression
"entanglement" denotes confused and complicated involvement between two entities,'97 a linguistic referent that does not, in this context,
constitute a clear and predictable standard. Most courts use the term
entanglement to describe issuer liability for pre-publication involvement with third-party misstatements,'98 although a majority of courts
have also embraced corporate control over the report's final contents
as the appropriate liability threshold.'9 9 Obviously, joint involvement
and solitary control are diametrically opposed concepts. Therefore, as
a first step towards refining the pre-publication entanglement standard, the term "entanglement" should be abandoned in favor of clearer
language describing the specific activities undertaken by firms in their
manager-analyst interactions that give rise to securities fraud liability.
In response to these deficiencies, a bright line should be drawn
at express corporate agreement with the final contents of an analyst's
draft report, and implied adoption theories should be rejected.
Accordingly, plaintiffs pleading securities fraud under Rule 10b-5

195. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
196. Compare In re Boston Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D. Mass. 1998)

(holding that entanglement can be demonstrated if the issuer fosters or induces the analyst's
misleading statement), with Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that there is no liability unless the issuer exercises complete control over the analyst

report's final contents).
197. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 284 (3d ed. 1994).

198. See In re Boston Tech., Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (finding most courts use the term
"entanglement").
199. See cases cited supra notes 138-40.
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should demonstrate (1) that company officials reviewed the final contents of a third party's statement prior to its publication, and (2) that
the company expressly agreed with the report's contents in unmistakable language, thereby adopting the statements as the company's
own. This proposed theory rests on the premise that markets will successfully adapt to liability standards that are clear and predictable. At
first blush the new theory seems to favor manager-analyst communications at the expense of investor protection, because it raises the bar
for actionable securities fraud. However, if the standard is applied
correctly, it serves both policy interests, because investors will be better able to determine the quality of corporate disclosures before the
fact and thereby protect themselves from fraud.
Part of the problem inherent in determining the validity of corporate disclosures to the market, including commentary on third party
statements, is that companies possess information asymmetricallyonly the company knows whether its disclosures are reliable.'
Analysts partly cure this problem by scrutinizing available data and
confirming its accuracy, 1 but their work is by no means a guarantee
of corporate veracity."° Realistically, the role of analysts in confirming
corporate disclosure accuracy works only in the sense that analysts
may penalize overreaching firms in the form of less market coverage.Y
Despite this check, however, investors that rely on analyst reports
have no immediate legal remedy when companies guide investors to
misleading conclusions without actually supplying false information.'
Moreover, investors cannot protect themselves by making investments
based on sound information. Avoiding this problem can take two
forms: either crafting a liability standard that imposes liability for
implicit company agreement or enabling investors to protect themselves. Given the intricacies of manager-analyst communications,
designing a manageable standard for misleading implications is unrealistic. By contrast, a liability standard based on explicit corporate
agreement cures this deficiency because investors will know when
analyst reports contain information that companies have guaranteed
by exposing themselves to legal recourse. In this way, investors will
benefit from more complete disclosure because firms will have to sig-

200. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 1030 (describing the moral hazard problem caused by
information asymmetry that companies possess vis-a-vis outsiders).
201. See id. (suggesting that analysts serve as bonding agents for corporate disclosures).
202. See, for example, In re Cirrus Logics Securities Litigation, 946 F. Supp. 1446, 1466-67
(N.D. Cal. 1996), for an example of a company that directly lied to an investment analyst.
203. See id. at 1030.
204. In some sense, investors reward analyst firms that consistently report accurate
information, but in the short term investors are still vulnerable to fraud without legal recourse.
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nal whether their disclosures are backed by a remedy or not, allowing
investors to calculate their risk premiums accordingly.
A standard based on explicit adoption also promotes market
efficiency because it allows manager-analyst communications to continue unfettered. 5 The only difference under the newly proposed
standard is that companies must indicate whether their commentary
rises to the level of adoption. All parties will recognize that company
activity short of explicit agreement carries no legal remedy and is,
implicitly, less reliable. With a greater focus on statements bearing
corporate certification, companies will experience pressure to characterize all comments and disclosures, and while many of these will not
rise to adoption, the additional degree of qualification should help
analysts create more accurate forecasts. As a result, securities prices
will embody a sufficient quantity of accurate information, including
uncertified predictions, to fairly approximate corporate value, while
investors will be better able to protect themselves by assessing the
remedy-backed reliability of various reports before making their investment decisions.
Finally, a standard premised on explicit corporate agreement
with a third party's pre-publication statements should relieve the
courts of the excessive litigation born of uncertainty. One of the paramount goals of Anglo-American jurisprudence is predictive certainty,
such that parties may determine their rights and liabilities before
taking action.2 ' The proposed explicit adoption standard achieves this
clarity, and as long as courts apply the standard consistently, the tide
of securities fraud claims should abate, as companies will know when
they will incur liability. Similarly, clear liability standards will give
parties incentives to settle claims actually brought, because the merits
of the actions will be easier to assess. Finally, the proposed explicit
adoption standard should also ensure doctrinal consistency with
Central Bank, since actionable corporate agreement with a third
party's statements will be limited to a single, decisive, affirmative act,
thereby removing any questions of secondary liability.

205. The manager-analyst communications are subject, of course, to the insider trading
prohibitions.
206. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457, 460-61
(1897).
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VIII. HYPOTHETICAL RESOLVED
Applied to the E.com hypothetical, the new standard would
make the exchange between company president Smith and analyst
Jones legally insignificant. Smith's winks, nods, and innuendo do not
cross the liability threshold. For E.com to incur liability for Jones's
statements to the market, Smith would have to give his express
agreement with the final draft of Jones's report before the information
was transmitted to the investing public. This demonstrates the uninteresting ex post aspects of the proposed standard. Observe, however,
its significance for analyst Jones's suspicion of Smith's statements. He
will press Smith to endorse the final version of his report, and, if
Smith does not, Jones will realize that Smith's claims about the company's prospects are overly optimistic. He might note this fact in his
report, or even draft a new, less optimistic report in order to explore
what assessment of E.com Smith could back with a legal remedy.
Smith might refuse to sign any draft report presented to him, but
Baker and other investors will place less confidence in E.com's
prospects-manifested in the form of lower security prices-unless
Smith does so. Moreover, Baker can make his decision to invest in
E.com with the advance knowledge of whether the company has
effectively bonded the information in the analyst's report. Thus, Baker
can better protect himself from investment risk by assessing the
quality of information regarding E.com's value. As long as courts
consistently apply the bright-line test, all parties will be better able to
assess their rights and liabilities before injury has occurred.

IX. CONCLUSION

The relationship between corporate managers and analysts is a
continuous, dangerous, and necessary balancing act between preserving capital market efficiency and protecting investors from market
manipulation. Determining corporate liability for misstatements made
by third-party analysts is therefore like searching for a bright line
down the middle of an already precipitous high wire. The clumsy entanglement doctrine has frustrated this effort. Although the post-publication ratification and conduit theories have improved the predictable application of the entanglement doctrine to certain manageranalyst interactions, the pre-publication entanglement theory remains
fraught with uncertainty. As a result, investors and managers have
turned to the courts ex post to determine whether a securities violation has occurred. Moreover, to the extent that companies may legally
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mislead the market by guiding analysts to erroneous conclusions, the
efficiency of the capital markets has been compromised.
Market-driven behavior provides the solution for this problem.
The search for a pre-publication entanglement bright line remains
futile as long as the question remains "when does a corporation imply
agreement with an analyst's report prior to publication?" Instead,
courts should announce the circumstances under which investor reliance is justified, leaving the market to adjust to the law, as opposed to
the law adjusting to the market. A bright line standard based on explicit company agreement with an analyst report's final contents
brings all parties down from the tightrope. If companies purchase
credibility by committing to the accuracy of an analyst report, then
investors will know which investments carry a legal remedy for fraud
and adjust their investment decisions accordingly. Investors will benefit from an improvement in the accuracy of corporate disclosures without chilling manager-analyst communications necessary for market
efficiency. Similarly, if managers, analysts, and investors know the
threshold past which companies incur liability for misrepresentations,
they can ascertain their respective legal rights and obligations before
causing or suffering damage, thereby conserving judicial resources.
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